Effects of Inequality on Redistribution : An empirical test on Norwegian local governments by Fuglerud, Torkel Larsen
  
Effects of Inequality on Redistribution 
 
An empirical test on Norwegian local 
governments 
 
Torkel Larsen Fuglerud 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thesis for the degree  
Master of Economic Theory and Econometrics  
 
 
UNIVERSITY OF OSLO  
 
November 2010 
 
II 
 
Preface 
This thesis has been written as a part of the Master of Economic Theory and Econometrics 
degree at the University of Oslo. 
I would like to start by thanking my supervisor Jon H. Fiva for his excellent help with writing 
this thesis. His help and patience has been invaluable throughout the process, and I could not 
have asked for a better thesis supervisor. 
I am also very grateful to Camilla Nore for her encouragement, suggestions and proof-
reading. This thesis would not have been the same without her help. 
All remaining errors and inaccuracies are mine, and mine alone. 
 
Oslo, November 2010. 
Torkel Larsen Fuglerud 
 
 
  
III 
 
Summary 
The large variation in the amount of government redistribution in democracies is a much 
discussed subject in modern economics, and the effect of income inequality on redistribution 
lies at the core of the debate. Meltzer and Richard (1981) present a model that hypothesizes 
that there is more redistribution in countries where the income inequality is high, due to the 
preferences of the median voter. This hypothesis has been tested many times, both on cross-
sectional and time-series data, with varying results. This thesis tests the effect of income 
inequality on redistribution utilizing panel data on Norwegian municipalities, using a fixed 
effects model,
1
 due to the potential problem of omitted variables affecting the results when 
using cross-sectional data. 
The skewness of the income distribution is used to measure the income inequality, and the 
monthly welfare norm for single-person households, set by the local government in each 
municipality, is used as the main measure of redistribution. The main finding is that inequality 
has a small, statistically significant, negative effect on the welfare norm, with the effect being 
so small that it is not economically significant. A standard deviation decrease in the income 
inequality measure would not decrease the norm by more than 30 NOK.  
Two sample cuts are made to test robustness. The effect of equality reverses after 2001, when 
a national guideline for welfare payments was introduced. Post-2001, inequality has a positive 
effect on redistribution, due to the fact that most local governments adapted to the new 
guideline. This caused governments above the new guideline to reduce their welfare norms, 
and vice versa. The municipalities are also divided into two groups to see if there are signs of 
welfare competition affecting the results. This is done by sorting the Norwegian counties by 
average municipality size, and dividing at the median. The municipalities in the counties 
where the average municipality size is the lowest make up the “high-pressure” group, where 
welfare competition is expected to be the strongest. The remaining municipalities make up the 
“low-pressure” group. The effect of inequality is slightly stronger in the “low-pressure” 
group, in line with the theory that welfare competition influences the results. 
Another measure of redistribution is also used, the average welfare payment per welfare 
client, made out by local welfare offices. Here the effect of inequality is highly statistically 
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 All regressions are done using STATA 11.  
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significant and positive, indicating that ceteris paribus, there is more redistribution in more 
unequal municipalities. There are strong concerns about endogeneity with this variable, and 
taking the previous results found into account, I conclude that the average welfare payment 
per client does not seem like a suitable measure of redistribution. 
Chapter 2 presents the Meltzer-Richard hypothesis, and formalizes it by presenting a textbook 
version of the model. Chapter 3 presents some previous empirical studies. Chapter 4 presents 
some institutional settings of the Norwegian municipality system, and discusses how the 
terms inequality and redistribution are used in the thesis. Chapter 5 presents the econometric 
specifications used. Chapter 6 presents the results from the main regression, while chapter 7 
tests robustness. Chapter 8 concludes. 
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1 Introduction 
Income redistribution is a much debated issue in today’s economics and politics. Some argue 
that redistribution by the government hampers economic growth due to weakened incentives 
to work, while others argue that redistribution can promote growth.
2
 The value of income 
equality is much less debated, even though countries vary greatly in the measures undertaken 
to create and promote equality. In some parts of the world, e.g. the US or Latin America, 
wealth redistribution is much less common than in Scandinavia or other parts of Europe. This 
thesis will not debate if equality and redistribution are to be desired or their impact on 
economic growth, rather it is the effect of inequality on redistribution that will be analyzed. Is 
there more income redistribution in places where there are large differences in income, or is 
redistribution more widespread in the situations where it is needed the least?  
Much research has been devoted to the issue and both international and within country 
differences in inequality has been analyzed, with the empirical literature so far being 
inconclusive. Acemoglu (2004) suggests that some questions concerning economic systems 
and policies are impossible to analyze using cross-country data alone, due to the large 
differences in economic institutions across countries. This thesis heeds this advice, and looks 
at differences in redistribution between local governments in Norway, as I consider a 
homogeneous setting with comparable institutions the best way to accurately estimate the 
effect of inequality. The empirical strategy employed is a fixed effects regression model used 
on Norwegian panel data. A fixed effects model is useful, since inference will be drawn over 
time within each municipality, and therefore omitted variables are unlikely to affect the 
results.  
Meltzer and Richard (1981) present a model of the relationship between income inequality 
and government redistribution that has shaped much of the following research on the subject. 
Their model proposes that there will be more redistribution is societies with high income 
inequality, compared to more equal societies. This result is known as the Meltzer-Richard 
hypothesis. The hypothesis is a result of the fact that the voters in the model who earns less 
than the mean wage will benefit from more income redistribution, therefore more voters 
                                                 
2
 Saint Paul and Verdier (1991) present some examples of negative views concerning the effect of redistribution 
on growth. Alesina and Rodrik (1994) is one example of the opposing view. 
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below the mean income will lead to more redistribution. Efforts to test the Meltzer-Richard 
hypothesis empirically has led to mixed results.   
Two articles have been written on the subject in the past using Norwegian local governments 
to analyze the relationship between equality and income redistribution, with conflicting 
results. Borge and Rattsø (2004) analyze how the income distribution in Norwegian 
municipalities varies with the level of property tax in the municipality, which they argue is 
redistributive. They find that the relationship between inequality and redistribution is positive, 
with a more uneven wage distribution leading to a higher property tax. Fiva and Rattsø (2006) 
find the opposite relationship, with inequality having a negative effect on the politically 
decided norm for monthly welfare payments in Norwegian municipalities. This uncertainty 
partially motivates this thesis.  
In section 2 the Meltzer-Richard hypothesis is presented formally through a workhorse model 
in political economy, and some alternative theories to the Meltzer-Richard hypothesis are 
briefly presented. Section 3 gives a brief overview of the existing empirical research, with a 
special focus on the two previous articles using Norwegian data. In contrast to previous 
research using Norwegian data, this thesis utilizes panel data; where earlier Norwegian 
studies have mainly relied on cross-sectional variation, this thesis also has time-series 
variation at hand. Section 4 describes the dataset, and defines the terms equality and 
redistribution as they will be used in this thesis. All data is provided by Statistics Norway. 
Some of the institutional settings of the Norwegian local government- and welfare systems 
are also summarized.  Section 5 gives a short explanation of the econometric techniques used, 
and presents the econometric specifications and empirical strategy.  Section 6 gives the results 
from the main regression. In Section 7 two sample cuts are made, to test the effect of the 
introduction of a national welfare guideline, and welfare competition. Another measure of 
redistribution is also used to test robustness, and some extra control variables are added. 
Section 8 concludes.  
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2 Theoretical framework 
This section presents the Meltzer-Richard hypothesis, and formalizes it by introducing one of 
the workhorse models in political economy. Some alternative theories to the Meltzer-Richard 
hypothesis are also briefly presented, although this presentation is far from complete.
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Downs (1957) presents the median voter theorem, which has been important in shaping 
today’s economic research on redistribution and taxation. The theorem proposes that in an 
election where voters’ preferences can be represented along a single dimension, voters will 
vote for the politician whose policy is closest to their own preferences. In the simplest 
formulation of the model, there are two parties or politicians competing for power, and the 
politicians or parties will maximize the number of votes they receive by adapting to the 
preferences of the median voter, and acting out his policy preference. Who wins the election 
will be uninteresting, as the policy preference of the median voter will be carried out with 
either winner. The median voter theorem is a gross simplification, for one due to the 
assumption of single dimension preferences, but the theorem is popular due to its simplicity, 
with the simplified election process allowing for study of richer policy problems.  
Romer (1975) creates a model with a linear tax-rate determined by majority voting, using the 
model introduced by Downs. He puts several assumptions on the preferences of the voters to 
get single-peaked preferences,
4
 so that he can use the median voter theorem. Roberts (1977) 
uses more general assumptions, and shows that the tax preferences of the agent with the 
median income will determine the outcome. These two studies differ from previous 
hypotheses, which mainly focuses on the incentives bureaucrats and politicians have to 
increase spending and their own control, for their own benefit.
5
 
Building on the works by Romer (1975) and Roberts (1977), Meltzer and Richard (1981) 
present a general equilibrium model of a labor economy, where the size of government is 
measured by the share of income redistributed. This income share is decided by majority 
voting as in Romer (1975) and Roberts (1977), and voters now take other voters labor-leisure 
choices into consideration when voting, e.g. an increased tax rate gives negative incentives to 
work and save.  
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 See Lind (2005) for a more complete survey on alternative theories to the Meltzer-Richard hypothesis. 
4
 Preferences where outcomes are preferred less, the further away they are from an agent’s ideal choice. 
5
 See Larkey et al (1980) for a review. 
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Figure 2.1, is an example of a right-skewed income distribution, which empirical studies have 
shown to be an accurate description of most income distributions (Meltzer and Richard, 
1983). In right-skewed income distributions the mean is higher than the median, as there are a 
small number of people whose income is much higher than the rest. Since most income 
distributions are skewed to the right as in figure 1.1,  an increase in mean income relative to 
the income of the decisive voter increases the size of government, meaning that ceteris 
paribus, we should expect to see more redistribution in unequal societies compared to more 
equal ones. As mentioned, this result is known as the Meltzer-Richard hypothesis. Meltzer 
and Richard point to the extension of the franchise in the nineteenth- and twentieth century as 
a major reason for government growth in modern times, as this introduced a large number of 
voters with a relatively low income (lower than the mean) into the electoral systems.  
To formalize the hypothesis presented by Meltzer and Richard (1981), I present a model with 
the same assumptions and results as the one proposed in Meltzer and Richard (1981), taken 
from Persson and Tabellini (2000, p 118). In the model there are two political parties 
competing to win an election, with voters voting over the tax rate. The voter mass is 
normalized to one, with voters looking to maximize their utility over two goods, consumption 
of a normal good and their leisure time. The political parties are trying to win the election. 
The preferences of voter i are:  
  Median    Mean 
Figure 2.1: a right-skewed income distribution, with the mean above the median.  
Greater distance between the mean and the median indicates a more unequal distribution. 
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                                                                      (2.1) 
where   denotes consumption and   denotes leisure. V(.) is the concave utility function of the 
voters. The private budget constraint is  
                                                                     (2.2) 
where   is the income tax-rate,    is individual labor supply and   a lump sum transfer from 
the government. The model assumes that some individuals are more productive than others, 
and this is modeled by some voters having more time than others, with the time constraint 
each individual faces being 
                                                                      (2.3) 
where   captures individual productivity, with more productive individuals having more time 
that can be spent on either work or leisure.    is distributed with a median,  
 , and a mean,   , 
with the distribution of   being skewed to the right, meaning that      as in figure 2.1. The 
workers solve the maximization problem 
max                        with regards to                        (2.4) 
where equation (2.3) has been solved for    and has been inserted into (2.4).  
The solution gives us optimal labor supply, which is given by the following expression 
                                                                  (2.5) 
with  
         
         
  
 
L(   is decreasing in  , and thus a higher tax rate leads to the workers working less. The 
average of    is   , so average labor supply is given by (2.5) and is equal to        . The 
government budget constraint can therefore be written 
                                                             (2.6) 
W( ) is the voters’ indirect utility function, that gives voter i’s preference over  , as 
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                                                            (2.7) 
where it has been inserted for   ,   and    from (2.3), (2.5) and (2.2) respectively. Maximizing 
equation (2.6) with regards to   gives 
      
  
          
     
  
                                              (2.8) 
Solving for   gives 
   
     
     
  
                                                               (2.9) 
As 
     
  
  , (2.9) implies that a unproductive voter (     ) prefers a positive tax rate, while 
a rich voter will prefer an income subsidy (   ) financed by a lump sum tax.  
   
     
      
  
                                                             (2.10) 
(2.10) shows that if the productivity of the median voter increases, the distance between the 
median and mean productivity will go down, and the median voter will prefer a lower tax rate. 
This tax rate will be implemented as the median voter theorem applies, and the candidates 
from both political parties will commit to the tax rate preferred by the median voter,   . If a 
candidate committed to another tax rate, the other candidate would win by committing to a tax 
rate closer to the one preferred by the median voter. Therefore, a less productive median voter 
(with unchanged mean productivity) or higher mean productivity (with an unchanged median 
voter) would lead to more redistribution, i.e. the Meltzer-Richard hypothesis. 
Several alternative models have been proposed as a counter to the Meltzer-Richard 
hypothesis, many proposing that the more income equality will lead to more redistribution, 
not less. Benabou (2000) presents a model where the decisive voter is richer than the median 
voter,
6
 due to people’s propensity to vote and participate in political activities is increasing 
with income and education. The model proposes that when credit and insurance markets are 
imperfect, a variety of policies that redistribute wealth from the rich to the poor can have a 
positive net effect on aggregate output, thereby creating more welfare. Examples of such 
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 But not necessarily richer than the mean voter. 
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policies include social insurance through taxes and transfers and publicly funded education. 
These types of policies are more popular in societies with little inequality, while in unequal 
societies there will be increased inequality in the future, due to less support for redistribution 
now. The relationship between inequality and redistribution is therefore U-shaped, with two 
stable steady states. One is a state where there is high inequality and low redistribution, in the 
other there is low inequality and high redistribution. Due to the similar size and structure of 
Norwegian municipalities, the model is not very relevant for analyzing differences in 
redistribution within Norway. 
Moene and Wallerstein (2001) emphasize the insurance aspect of state welfare policies. In 
their model different groups of the population have different incomes, and face different risks 
regarding future income, with a share of the population being completely outside the labor 
market. Government spending is characterized by a tax rate that determines spending, and a 
distributive parameter that determines how welfare spending is targeted. They show that 
equality’s effect on welfare spending is dependent on where the spending is targeted. When 
spending is targeted towards the employed, greater inequality, like a situation where the 
median wage decreases while the mean wage stays constant, increases the support for 
redistribution. When spending is targeted towards those outside the labor market, inequality 
reduces the support for redistribution. 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) try to explain why much of the redistribution carried out is 
inefficient. They present a model where the political influence of a group depends on its size, 
as political systems cannot credibly commit to future policies, as they are dependent on who’s 
in power. Inefficient redistribution, such as price subsidies or certain labor market regulations, 
is therefore used as a tool to sustain political power, as this redistribution makes it marginally 
more attractive to stay within a group. Their model explains many of the redistribution 
policies used in the agricultural sector, in labor markets and in international trade. They find 
that inefficient redistribution is more prevalent when production factors are less specific to a 
sector. 
Barth and Moene (2010) explore how equality can multiply due to the complementarity 
between wage determination and welfare spending. They argue that there are two effects in 
play:  
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i) The equality magnifying effect: more equal wages will lead to voters becoming 
more similar in their welfare state demands. Most people will demand more social 
insurance when their income increases, so a more equal income distribution will 
lead to a larger welfare state.   
ii) The wage equalizing effect: a more generous welfare state will lead to less income 
inequality, as the difference between high- and low income earners goes down 
with higher welfare benefits.  
Together these two effects create a multiplying effect, as increased equality will lead to more 
welfare spending, which in turn will lead to more equality and so on. They name this effect 
“the equality multiplier”. They test this theory empirically, both by looking at international 
and U.S. data, and find support for their model. 
3 Empirical background 
Meltzer and Richard (1983) tests their hypothesis stated in Meltzer and Richard (1981) 
empirically, using time-series data from the United States from 1937 to 1977, (excluding 
1940-1945), checking the relationship between government spending and the ratio of mean to 
median income. Their analysis rests on the assumption that government spending is a good 
measure for redistribution. They find support for their hypothesis, although they only test the 
United States and are unable to capture year-fixed effects. 
Gouveia and Masia (1996) test the Meltzer-Richard hypothesis using panel data on US states, 
from 1979 to 1991. Instead of using government size as a measure of redistribution like 
Meltzer and Richard (1981), they test if percent of government income devoted to 
redistribution grows when inequality grows. A variety of econometric techniques is used, 
including a fixed-effects regression model. They fail to find support for the original model 
proposed by Meltzer and Richard, and some of their findings go in the opposite direction.  
Milanovic (2000) tests the Meltzer-Richard hypothesis using a fixed effects model, with data 
from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) on 24 countries, with 79 observations in all. He 
argues that previous studies on the subject have been seriously flawed, due to the lack of 
proper data on income before taxes and transfers, which he calls factor-income, in the past. 
He finds strong support for the Meltzer-Richard hypothesis, with the poor in countries with 
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more inequality “catching up” to the poor in countries with less unequal factor-incomes. This 
effect is reduced when pensions are treated as a part of the factor-income. When pensions are 
excluded, Milanovic finds that the middle-class does not gain from redistribution, while the 
situation is more unclear when pensions are included. Due to this, the paper concludes that the 
median voter hypothesis fails to explain redistributive transfers. 
Iversen and Soskice (2006) point to how the Meltzer-Richard hypothesis has failed to explain 
much of the variance in redistribution among democracies, and present a general model of 
redistribution. Their main focus is on a country’s election system; their model predicts that in 
countries with a proportional representation system, centre-left governments will be more 
prevalent, and there will be more redistribution, compared to countries with majoritarian 
election systems. They test their model on LIS data on 14 democracies, with observations 
ranging from the late sixties to the late nineties. Their panel is unbalanced with a total of 61 
observations, with some countries having as little as two observations. They find that 
inequality has a negative effect on redistribution when political and institutional variables are 
not controlled for, contrary to the model in Meltzer and Richard (1981). The effect is both 
statistically and economically significant, with a standard deviation’s increase in inequality 
leading to a 0,3 standard deviation reduction in redistribution. However, this effect disappears 
when controlling for political and institutional variables and no statistically significant effects 
are found. 
Ramcharan (2010) tests the relationship between economic inequality and redistributive 
policies in U.S. counties, using data from 1890 to 1930. County-level data is used as 
redistributive policies were mostly decided by local governments during the time period, and 
the analysis is restricted to within-state variation to reduce the potential impact of omitted 
variables, such as institutional and political variables. Several approaches are utilized, with 
both OLS and instrumental variable strategies used to contrast results. Both per capita tax 
revenue and per capita education expenditure is used as measures of redistribution. The 
results point to a negative correlation between economic inequality and redistribution, with 
the results from the instrumental variable regressions being consistently larger than the OLS 
results. The results are both statistically and economically significant, with a standard 
deviation increase in inequality being associated with an 18% percent decline in per capita 
education spending, and a 9% or 23% decrease in the government per capita tax revenue, 
depending on the year. 
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Borge and Rattsø (2004) is the first article to test the Meltzer-Richard hypothesis on 
Norwegian local governments, using a panel dataset from 1996 to 1998. Although a panel 
dataset is used, there is substantially more cross-sectional variation than time-series variation, 
due to the short time span. The effect of income distribution on the local governments’ choice 
of tax structure is estimated, with local governments choosing between user charges related to 
housing related utility services, called a poll tax by the authors, and a property tax. They 
assume that the property tax is redistributive, citing the conclusion of a government 
commission that finds that the property tax is roughly proportional to household income. An 
instrumental variable approach is used to deal with the potential endogeneity problem of 
background factors such as industrial organization deciding the income distribution. The 
results support the Meltzer-Richard hypothesis, as they find that a more equal income 
distribution shifts some of the tax burden from the property tax to the poll tax, reducing the 
degree of income distribution in the tax system. A weakness of the study is that the taxes’ 
make up a fairly small part of the local governments’ budget; the property tax generates 2% of 
the local governments’ revenue, the poll tax 8%. The Norwegian local government system 
does not allow the local governments much discretion in collecting revenue, and it is 
generally thought that local governments in Norway redistribute more through transfers using 
grants from the central government, than through tax collection. 
The second article using Norwegian data, by Fiva and Rattsø (2006), set out to evaluate the 
importance of welfare competition in Norwegian local governments, using an instrumental 
variable approach on cross-sectional data from 1998. While the article’s main focus is not the 
effect of income inequality on redistribution, the municipalities’ income distribution is 
included as a control variable. They separate the expected welfare payments from the 
municipalities’ welfare norms decided politically (described in greater detail in chapter 4), 
and find that inequality has a negative impact on the welfare norm set by local politicians, 
going against the Meltzer-Richard hypothesis. They do not find any statistically significant 
effect of equality on expected welfare payments.  
4 Data and institutional setting 
The number of Norwegian local governments has gradually decreased since their conception 
in 1837, and varies in the dataset used from 440 in 1993 to 430 in 2008. Norwegian local 
governments are well suited for testing the relationship between inequality and government 
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redistribution, due to their similar size and structure. The local governments get most of their 
income from grants from the central government and have limited options to attain more 
revenue, but have a large degree of freedom in deciding how to use their income, even though 
they face some regulations concerning the coverage and standard of services they provide. 
Their main welfare responsibilities are child care, primary education and elderly care; on 
average these items account for roughly 45 percent of the municipalities spending (Fiva and 
Natvik, 2010). 
4.1 Inequality 
The main purpose of this thesis is to test the effect of income inequality on the level of 
redistribution, and it is therefore important to define how the terms inequality and 
redistribution will be used. To measure the wage inequality I will use the ratio of median- to 
mean gross income, which captures the skewness of the wage distribution: 
             
           
                                                                          (4.1) 
This ratio is the same measure used originally by Meltzer and Richard (1981), and effectively 
captures the level of wage equality, not inequality, as a higher number means more equality. 
For a given mean, an increased median means a more even wage distribution. Income is 
defined as wage-, capital- and business income, plus pensions, for people aged 17 and above 
in the municipalities. As described in section 2, most wage distributions are skewed to the 
right (Meltzer and Richard, 1983), with the mean being higher than the median.  
Table 4.1: summary statistics for mean- and median income and equality. Mean- and median wage in 2008 NOK. 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N 
mean 244972 47390 148601 702986 6915 
median 216045 40420 127819 360800 6915 
equality 0,8835 0,0469 0,3917 1,020612 6915 
 
Table 4.1 presents summary statistics for the mean- and median gross wage in the 
municipalities, as well as for the equality measure. We see that the mean value for the mean 
wage is above the mean value for the median wage. 
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The equality measure of the median/mean ratio has known flaws (Borge and Rattsø, 2004),
7
 
as an example consider an increase in low-level wages below the mean, with an unchanged 
median wage. This would reduce income inequality, as the distance between the top and 
bottom earners would be reduced, but the increased low-level wages would increase the mean, 
reducing the median to mean ratio, indicating increased inequality. Despite this, the median to 
mean ratio is the best measure of equality available, and it is the most frequent measure of 
income inequality in related literature (e.g. Borge and Rattsø (2004), Fiva and Rattsø (2006), 
Meltzer and Richard (1981)).  
Table 4.2 is a table of summary statistics for the mean gross income measured in 2008 NOK, 
by year. We see that the mean wage has steadily increased from 1993 to 2008, with the total 
change being approximately 12 000 NOK.  
Table 4.2: summary statistics for mean gross income, measured in 2008 NOK, by year. 
Year Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N 
1993 191789 21449 148601 298424 432 
1994 194324 22041 152445 304756 433 
1995 197735 22341 154339 305018 433 
1996 206483 24027 162857 321968 433 
1997 214073 26890 162240 359597 433 
1998 227359 26565 173030 355911 433 
1999 235746 30976 176619 486877 433 
2000 243970 30959 181574 411957 433 
2001 247109 27946 186940 386804 433 
2002 260466 30901 199776 420929 434 
2003 260367 32353 193689 421007 434 
2004 267144 32792 201958 436433 433 
2005 286651 46462 209783 702986 429 
2006 276114 29603 216386 426389 430 
2007 300454 32873 236558 470936 429 
2008 311138 32929 242700 478200 430 
 
 
 
                                                 
7
 Another measure of income equality would have been nice to test robustness, like a  measure of some sort 
involving deciles or quantiles, but such data does not exist on a municipality level for Norway. Borge and Rattsø 
(2004) use the gap between the 75% and 25% fractiles as an alternative measure of inequality, while Barth and 
Moene (2010) use the ratio of the 9th to 1st deciles of gross income as their main measure of inequality. 
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4.2 Redistribution 
In Norway, providing welfare benefits is a local responsibility. The Social Services Act set 
restrictions and guidelines for the implementation of these services, but also leaves discretion 
to the local governments concerning the generosity of the system. In this thesis the 
redistribution perspective is confined to social welfare support, from the general population to 
people receiving welfare benefits, such as the long-term unemployed. The group receiving 
this kind of support is fairly small, in 2007 and 2008 2,3% of the population received this type 
of support (Grebbstad and Holm, 2009). It is important to keep this in mind throughout the 
thesis, as this is just one way of approaching the issue, and several models predict that 
inequality will have differing impacts on redistribution, depending on the form and targeting 
of the redistribution. In the context of the model presented by Moene and Wallerstein (2001), 
the group receiving welfare benefits would represent the agents outside the labor market. 
Table 4.3: summary statistics for the politically decided welfare norm per month, nominal NOK, single-person 
households. 
Year Mean Std. Dev. cv8 Min Median Max N 
1995 3621 523 0,14 1900 3660 5281 430 
1996 3711 524 0,14 1900 3698,5 5520 430 
1997 3808 556 0,15 2102 3800 5722 429 
1998 3969 605 0,15 2258 3932,5 6441 430 
1999 4043 612 0,15 2484 4002,5 5964 430 
2000 4118 623 0,15 2600 4068 6969 430 
2001 4119 542 0,13 2760 3950 7291 430 
2002 4174 466 0,11 2760 4000 6140 430 
2003 4163 434 0,10 3000 4000 5948 430 
2004 4202 386 0,09 3000 4140 6120 430 
2005 4220 442 0,10 2140 4140 8600 433 
2006 4327 395 0,09 3120 4270 9434 428 
2007 4585 371 0,08 3000 4600 10022 431 
2008 4739 357 0,08 3500 4720 10022 420 
 
The local council in each municipality sets a guideline for welfare payments to a standardized 
user, while the actual payments are done independently by the local welfare office. The main 
focus in this thesis is to see how inequality affects this politically decided norm set by the 
local government. As seen in table 4.3 there are differences in the level of support, both over 
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 Coefficient of variation, calculated by dividing the standard deviation by the mean. 
14 
 
time and between municipalities, although this variation is much smaller than the variation in 
income seen in table 4.2. The welfare norm include different things in different 
municipalities, some norms cover living expenses, dental costs and such, while this is not 
included other places. This is not a big problem in this thesis, as only variation within each 
municipality is analyzed. One would expect this politically decided norm to capture the 
preferences of the politicians, and the strategic choice they make when setting the norm, 
knowing what policies the bureaucrats have implemented in the past.  
Figure 4.1 is a scatter plot depicting the relationship between the measure of equality and the 
politically decided welfare norm in each municipality in 2000. More equality is associated 
with a higher welfare norm in the figure. 
 
Figure 4.1: relationship between median/mean ratio and welfare norm measured in 2008 NOK, all municipalities, 
year 2000. 
Equality equals gross median income divided by gross mean income, for persons aged 17 and above, with pensions included. 
Welfare norm is the politically decided monthly welfare norm for single-person households, measured in 1000 NOK. 
 
In 2001 national guidelines for social security benefits were introduced, to standardize the 
level of benefits provided in the municipalities. Fiva (2009) find that the introduction of the 
national guideline had a large impact on municipalities’ welfare norms, with 119 
municipalities immediately implementing the exact national guideline. We see in table 4.3 
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that the coefficient of variation has decreased and the mean has stayed close to the national 
guideline, confirming this finding. 
Table 4.4: national guideline for monthly welfare payments to single-person households. 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
National guideline for single-person 
households in nominal NOK 
3880 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
National guideline for single-person 
households in constant 2008 NOK 
4308 4478 4367 4502 4431 4468 4775 4720 
 
Table 4.4 shows the development of the national guideline since it was introduced in 2001, 
both in nominal and constant NOK. We see that from 2001 to 2008 the guideline has 
increased by more than 400 constant NOK. Figure 4.3 shows the development of the mean 
welfare norm, national guideline and mean wage for all municipalities in 2008 NOK. We see 
that the welfare norm has been more or less constant from 1993 to 2008. This is in contrast to 
the mean wage, which has grown almost every year, as we also saw in table 4.2.  
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Figure 4.3: development of the mean monthly welfare norm, mean monthly national guideline for single-person 
households and monthly gross mean wage, for all municipalities, measured in 2008 NOK, 1993-2008.                      
Gross mean wage is wage, capital and business income, plus pensions, for all individuals older than 17. 
4.3 Robustness 
In section 7, two sample cuts are made to test robustness. First, the observations are split into 
groups pre- and post 2001, to check how the introduction of a national guideline has affected 
the results. Judging from previous studies and table 4.3, we would expect equality to have 
more of an impact on redistribution before the introduction of the national guidelines, since 
local governments seem to have adjusted to the national guidelines, and therefore had more 
freedom when deciding their welfare policy before it was introduced.  
Wildasin (1991) present a model where several local or national entities (e.g. municipalities, 
counties, countries) share a common labor market, with workers who are mobile between the 
entities. The model hypothesizes that when an area increases its welfare benefits, it will 
receive an influx of welfare recipients, further increasing the costs of having more generous 
welfare benefits. Fiva and Rattsø (2006) conclude that there is a geographic pattern in 
Norwegian welfare benefits, and find that welfare competition has a significant effect on the 
welfare norm in Norwegian municipalities.  
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To see if there are signs of welfare competition in the data, municipalities are divided into 
two. Counties are sorted by average municipality size, and divided into two at the median.
9
 
Municipalities in the counties with the lowest average size make up the “high pressure” 
group,
10
 where one might expect that inequality has less of an impact on redistribution, as 
municipalities will be more affected by the redistribution level in surrounding municipalities. 
If the local government opted for a more generous welfare scheme, one would think that the 
municipalities in the “high pressure” group would be more vulnerable to receiving large 
influxes of welfare clients from surrounding municipalities, due to the smaller distances 
between municipalities in these counties. If this is correct, the “low-pressure” group would be 
better suited for testing the relationship between equality and redistribution, as municipalities 
in this group would have more discretion when deciding their welfare policy. 
Figure 4.4 shows how the development of the mean welfare norm has been in the “high-
pressure” and “low-pressure” groups, from 1993 to 2008. We see that the welfare norm in the 
“low-pressure” group is above the welfare norm in the “high-pressure” group for the entire 
period, although the difference starts getting smaller in 2001, when the national welfare 
guidelines were introduced. In 2008 the mean for the two groups are roughly equal. The 
difference between the two groups further motivates the need to test for welfare competition.  
                                                 
9
 Municipality sizes were not available for the entire time period, so size in 2008 is used as a measure for 
municipality size. There has been little variation in municipality sizes in the time period, so this is 
unproblematic. 
10
 The group with municipalities in counties with below-median average municipality size consists of the 
municipalities in Akershus, Østfold, Vestfold, Rogaland, Hordaland, Buskerud, Møre og Romsdal, Vest-Agder, 
Aust-Agder and Oslo municipality. Municipalities from the remaining counties make up the other group. 
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Figure 4.4: development of the monthly welfare norm to single-households for municipalities in the “high-pressure” 
and “low-pressure” groups and the national welfare guideline, measured in 2008 NOK, 1993-2008.                                                                                   
The “high-pressure” group consists of municipalities in counties with the average municipality size below the national 
median. The “low-pressure” group consists of the remaining municipalities. The national welfare guideline is the monthly 
guideline for welfare support to single-person households. 
Also in section 7 an alternative measure of redistribution is introduced, with the average 
monthly welfare payment per client being used as a separate measure of redistribution, as an 
extension to main regression specifications. This variable captures the actual welfare 
payments to the recipients, carried out by the local welfare offices in each municipality, in 
contrast to the welfare norms decided by each local government. It is interesting to check the 
relationship between equality and the welfare norm, to see if the relationship found between 
equality and the politically decided welfare norm carries over into the actual welfare 
payments. However, there are potentially serious problems with this measure of 
redistribution, as it does not take into account the number- or the diversity of welfare clients 
in each municipality, and may therefore not reflect the generosity of each local government, 
as welfare clients are a very heterogeneous group. Welfare clients in one municipality could 
potentially have much differing needs and costs compared to welfare clients in another 
municipality.  
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5 Econometric specification 
Where similar studies have relied mainly on cross-sectional variation, the data set used in this 
thesis also offers time-series variation, with data being available from 1993 to 2008. The main 
model used is a fixed effects regression model. A fixed effects model creates a dummy 
variable for each entity we are measuring the fixed effect of, in this thesis Norwegian 
municipalities, and omits the standard intercept. Ordinary least squares (OLS henceforth) is 
then run on the data, including these dummies. This allows each municipality to have its own 
intercept, but all municipalities have the same slope. The main equation is:  
                                                                 (5.1) 
where i denotes the municipality and t denotes the year.                is the politically 
decided welfare benefit norm for a single-person household in municipality i, measured in 
1000 NOK.            is the gross median income over gross mean income in municipality i, 
and   is its effect on the benefit norm and the main coefficient of interest.   is a vector of 
control variables and   is a vector of coefficients.    is the municipality fixed effect in local 
government i, and time fixed effects,  t,  are also included.      is the error term. Control 
variables are added in steps, as some of the variables could be endogenous and we are 
interested in seeing how the added variables affect the results.  
It is assumed that 
                                                                           (5.2) 
meaning that the residual terms are uncorrelated with the regressors, which is the standard 
OLS assumption. The municipalities’ intercepts can vary from year to year due to the time 
fixed effects, but the yearly effect is equal for all municipalities. All regressions will also 
include the control variable       , which is average gross income in each municipality, 
measured in 1000 NOK. Wheaton (2000) proposes that all else equal, local governments with 
greater taxpayer income will have higher welfare levels and a greater share of welfare 
recipients among its residents, as redistribution is motivated by altruism. This effect is not the 
interesting effect in this thesis, but it is important to control for as it is likely to have an 
impact on the dependent variable. Both              and        are measured in 2008 
NOK. 
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A fixed effects model only measures the variation within each municipality, as all cross-
sectional variation between municipalities are assigned to the municipality specific dummy   . 
This means that much of the variation within the sample is lost, as only the variation within 
each municipality is measured. Therefore, the fixed effect estimator is sometimes called the 
within estimator. A certain amount of degrees of freedom are lost, equal to the number of 
dummy variables implicitly created to measure the fixed effects minus one, due to each 
municipality having its own intercept. The reward of using a fixed effects model is a reduced 
risk of omitted variable bias, that could potentially assign variation belonging to excluded 
variables to the main coefficient of interest,  . In section 6 the results from fixed effects 
regression will be compared to OLS results.  
The fixed effects model does not explain the causal relationship between equality and 
redistribution, and reverse causality could potentially be an issue when estimating the 
relationship. In general, determining the causal relationship between equality and 
redistribution is not straight forward, as far-reaching redistributive policies such as taxes and 
education-spending could affect the degree of income equality.  An instrumental variable 
approach could be used to overcome this, as in Ramcharan (2010). Since the redistribution 
measure in this thesis is narrow, I judge the issue with reverse causality to be insignificant, as 
it is unlikely that benefits received by a small number of population will have a significant 
impact of the income distribution for the whole population. 
The baseline model includes equality and income as the only explanatory variables, together 
with municipality- and time fixed effects: 
                                                                     (5.3) 
For reasons mentioned previously, it would not make sense to exclude the time fixed effects 
even in the baseline model.  
The first control variables added are demographic variables, which are likely to affect the 
demand for social security in the municipality and the level of equality, as people of different 
ages tend to have different demand for social services. Grebbstad and Holm (2009) find that 
the average age of social welfare recipients is lower than the average of the general 
population. The variables       and        is the percentage of the population that are ages 
zero to six and seven to 15, while the variable         is the percentage of the population 66 
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and older. The variable         is the municipalities’ total population measured in 1000 
people, which is included because welfare recipients in populous municipalities generally 
receive higher welfare transfers. The average welfare payments in municipalities with less 
than 50 000 inhabitants is 555 NOK, compared to 1223 NOK in municipalities with more 
than 50 000 people (Grebbstad and Holm, 2009). A worry when adding the demographic 
control variables is Tiebout sorting, meaning that households would be sorted between the 
different municipalities, in order of their preferences for welfare services. This would lead to 
the demographic variables being endogenous, as age groups that on average has a higher 
demand for welfare services would be more represented in municipalities with a high welfare 
norm.  
The next control variable to be added is a variable capturing the proportion of votes going to 
parties on the left side of the political spectrum,               . Parties on the left side are 
generally thought to have a greater wish for redistribution and an increased support for social 
security. It is not apparent that this is a good control as also this variable could be 
endogenous, with increased equality leading to more votes for parties on the left wing, leading 
to more redistribution. Still, it is interesting to see how the variable will affect the results. A 
study of Norwegian municipalities (Fiva, 2009), finds that welfare policy does affect 
residential choices of welfare recipients. For this reason, characteristics such as 
unemployment and higher education are not included in the main econometric specification, 
as they could potentially be endogenous. They are however included in section 7.4, to see 
their effect. Table 5.1 present summary statistics for both of the dependent variables and all 
controls. 
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Table 5.1: Summary statistics for the monthly welfare norm, monthly average support per welfare recipient and all 
control variables. Welfare_norm, supportpercase and income in 1000,  2008 NOK. 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N 
welfare_norm 4,716 0,62 2,29 10,402 6854 
supportpercase 25,758 9,44 0 70,980 5202 
equality 0,8835 0,0469 0,3917 1,0210 6915 
income 244,972 47,390 148,601 702,986 6915 
pop1000 10,351 29,761 0,209 560,484 6946 
age06 0,089 0,013 0,042 0,148 6946 
age715 0,121 0,014 0,074 0,189 6946 
elderly 0,164 0,037 0,066 0,322 6946 
votesh~_left 0,378 0,141 0 1 6938 
edupercent 0,018 0,013 0,002 0,120 6923 
unemployment 0,029 0,015 0 0,130 6942 
 
At the start of section 6 the similar study from Fiva and Rattsø (2006) is replicated. Since this 
study is purely cross-sectional, OLS is used to estimate the equation: 
                                                                                                (5.4) 
where               is the politically decided welfare benefit norm per month measured in 
1000 NOK for municipality i,    is the constant term, equality is the measure of the income 
distribution which is the median over mean wage ratio for municipality i,    is a vector of 
controls for municipality i, and    is the error term. The vector of controls includes the 
average gross income for persons 17 and over measured in 1000 NOK, the natural logarithm 
of the municipalities’ population, demographic variables measuring the amount of persons 
between zero and five, six to 15 and over 67 years of age, and the amount of votes going to 
parties belonging to the left-wing of Norwegian politics. The regression in section 6 is not an 
exact replica of the previous study, as the variables g, which is lump-sum grants from the 
central government and the local government’s tax-income per capita, sqm price, which is the 
average municipal housing price per square meter, and the dummy housing, that measures if 
support to housing is included in the dependent variable, are included in Fiva and Rattsø 
(2006), but not in my regression. 
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6 Results 
I start by replicating the similar study found in Fiva and Rattsø (2006), to test that the same 
results are found.
11
 Table 6.1 is a cross-sectional regression similar to the one in Fiva and 
Rattsø for 1998, with the welfare benefit norm per month for single-person households 
measured in 1000 NOK as the dependent variable. The results in table 6.1 are very similar to 
the ones found by Fiva and Rattsø, but equality has a stronger impact on the welfare norm in 
my regression. Equality has positive and statistically significant effect on the politically 
decided welfare norm in both regressions, with the equality coefficient below, 2,83, being 
higher than the coefficient found by Fiva and Rattsø, 1,91. This is not a large difference 
economically; an increase in the equality variable of one standard deviation would result in an 
increase in the welfare norm of 141 NOK using the results from table 6.1, compared to an 
increase of 96 NOK using the results found by Fiva and Rattsø. 
Table 6.1: OLS regression for 1998. Welfare norm and income measured in 1000 NOK. 
 (1) 
VARIABLES welfare_norm 
  
income 0.00390 
 (0.0270) 
equality 2.825*** 
 (0.787) 
logn -0.0941*** 
 (0.0347) 
age06 8.621** 
 (3.345) 
age715 6.125** 
 (2.828) 
elderly 4.666*** 
 (1.465) 
voteshare_left 0.0332 
 (0.252) 
  
Observations 429 
R-squared 0.116 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
To test the results found by Fiva and Rattsø (2006) we will see if the results hold up when a 
fixed effects model is used and time-series variation is added. It could be that cross-sectional 
                                                 
11
 Control variables are not added one by one as described in the previous chapter, as this is not done in Fiva and 
Rattsø (2006). 
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analysis fails to take local government and municipality specific differences into account, and 
therefore suffers from omitted variable bias. Again using the welfare benefit norm per month 
for single-person households measured in 1000 NOK as the dependent variable, but now 
covering the years from 1993 to 2008, specification (1) is the baseline model which controls 
for year- and local government fixed effects and the average gross income in the 
municipalities. Specification (2) also includes demographic variables, and specification (3) 
includes the control variables from (2) plus the variable               , which is the 
percentage of votes going to left-wing parties. We see in table 6.2 that the effect of equality is 
positive and not statistically significant in specification (1) and positive and statistically 
significant in specification (2) and (3) at the 10% level.  
Table 6.2: fixed effects regression, 1993 -2008. Welfare_norm and income measured in constant, 1000 NOK. Time- 
and municipality fixed effects included in all regressions. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES welfare_norm welfare_norm welfare_norm 
    
equality 0.105 0.557* 0.561* 
 (0.324) (0.337) (0.338) 
income 0.00155** 0.00201*** 0.00201*** 
 (0.000740) (0.000772) (0.000773) 
pop1000  0.0216*** 0.0214*** 
  (0.00390) (0.00391) 
age06  0.896 0.893 
  (1.034) (1.035) 
age715  0.249 0.230 
  (0.901) (0.902) 
elderly  3.940*** 3.935*** 
  (0.767) (0.769) 
voteshare_left   0.0254 
   (0.108) 
    
Observations 6,838 6,838 6,830 
R-squared 0.068 0.075 0.075 
Municipalities 436 436 436 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The results of the equality coefficients becoming more positive and statistically significant 
when adding more controls is interesting, and shows that the demographic controls has a large 
influence on the results, with the municipality population and the proportion of people over 
66 years old both statistically significant at the one percent level. The control voteshare_left is 
not statistically significant and does not have much influence on the results in specification 
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(3). The results in (2) and (3) partially validate the findings in Fiva and Rattsø (2006) and do 
not support the Meltzer-Richard hypothesis, as inequality is shown to have a negative effect 
on the welfare norm. However, the economic significance of equality on the welfare norm is 
very small. A standard deviation increase in the equality variable would lead to a 5 NOK 
increase under specification (1), and a 26 NOK increase in specification (2) and (3), hardly a 
substantial effect.  
These results indicate that the level of wage equality in each municipality does not have much 
effect on the municipalities’ welfare benefits. The little impact there is, is positive and 
statistically significant when including all control variables, with more equal municipalities 
having higher levels of welfare benefits. This goes against the Meltzer-Richard hypothesis 
and the findings of Borge and Rattsø (2004), and confirms relationship between equality and 
the politically decided welfare norm found in Fiva and Rattsø (2006). However, the effect 
found in table 6.2 is significantly weaker than the effect in Fiva and Rattsø (2006). The R
2
 in 
the regression is very low, indicating that the model explains little of the variation within each 
municipality. 
We see in table 6.2 that the coefficient for the average gross income has economic 
significance, with a standard deviation increase in income leading to a 0,8 standard deviation 
increase in the welfare norm. This effect is in agreement with Wheaton (2000), who proposes 
that higher income levels are associated with more redistribution. The result goes against 
Gramlich and Laren (1984) who argue that this relationship is negative, due to the motive for 
income security. They argue that voters are more likely to be in favor of welfare benefits if 
they feel they might need them one day, and those voters who feel uncertainty about their 
own income might emphasize more with transfer recipients, compared to richer voters. Fiva 
and Rattsø (2006) point to a characteristic of the Norwegian local government grant system 
that could lead to a distortion of the effect of gross income on welfare benefits:  
“The equalizing grant system basically turns around the private income differences between 
the municipalities. The municipalities with a high private income level end up with relatively 
low local government revenue per capita, while private poor municipalities end up as 
relatively rich local governments.” 
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7 Extensions and robustness 
In this chapter the econometric specification from chapter 6 is extended, to see how the results 
are affected when some changes are made to the specifications. The sample is split to see if 
the previous results hold up, and a new dependent variable is used to see the effect of equality 
on another measure of redistribution.  
7.1 Results pre- and post 2001  
Since the government started setting a national guideline for the welfare benefit level per 
recipient in 2001, the local governments had more freedom when deciding the welfare benefit 
level before 2001, and one would suspect equality (or inequality) to have a bigger impact on 
the benefit level before the introduction of a national guideline. We saw that municipalities 
adapted to the national guidelines both in table- and figure 4.3, meaning that municipalities 
had more discretion when deciding their welfare norm before 2001. It therefore seems likely 
that it is best to test the effect of equality in the years from 1993 to 2000. 
To check this we run the same regressions as in table 6.2, but now run separate regressions for 
the years before and after 2001. Aside from the sample cut, specifications are unchanged from 
the previous section.   
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Table 7.1: fixed effects regression, 1993-2000. Welfare_norm and income measured in constant, 1000 NOK. Time- and 
municipality fixed effects included in all regressions. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES welfare_norm welfare_norm welfare_norm 
    
equality 0.864 1.002* 1.005* 
 (0.539) (0.547) (0.547) 
income 0.00176 0.00198 0.00199 
 (0.00138) (0.00142) (0.00142) 
pop1000  0.00426 0.00396 
  (0.0108) (0.0108) 
age06  1.670 1.750 
  (1.888) (1.898) 
age715  -0.736 -0.654 
  (1.621) (1.633) 
elderly  2.392 2.414 
  (1.518) (1.519) 
voteshare_left   0.0944 
   (0.197) 
    
Observations 3,414 3,414 3,412 
R-squared 0.016 0.017 0.017 
Municipalities 429 429 429 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The results in table 7.1, for the years from 1993 to 2000, are still positive for all specifications 
and have increased slightly, but they still have little economical significance. A standard 
deviation change in the equality variable would lead to an increase in the welfare norm of 47 
NOK. Once again, only specification (2) and (3) are statistically significant, at the 10% level. 
The equality coefficients from specification (2) and (3) are more or less unchanged from table 
6.2, and a change in the measure of equality would still have a very minor impact on the 
welfare norms in each municipality. If we went from the least equal wage distribution in the 
data to the most equal, we would get a change in the welfare norm of 630 NOK, which is 
about a one standard deviation increase in the welfare norm.  
The regressions from 2002-2008
12
 however all turn out negative and statistically significant at 
the five- or ten percent level, showing that the effect of equality is reversed after the 
introduction of the national guideline. This is a natural implication of the fact that the 
municipalities adjusted to the new national guideline as shown in Fiva (2009), as local 
                                                 
12
 Not reported. 
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governments above the norm before 2001 had to reduce their norms to adapt to the national 
guideline and vice versa. 
7.2 Heterogeneous effect 
Fiva and Rattsø (2006) note that the spread in welfare benefits varies among municipalities 
within the same county, and in counties with small distances and transportation costs, they 
find that there is less variation in the expected benefits compared to counties with greater 
distances. Fiva (2009) finds that welfare policy has a significant impact on residential choices. 
It could be that the effect of equality differs with the degree of mobility between the 
municipalities; to check this we will try to see how welfare competition affects the results.  
As explained in section 4, the sample is sorted by average municipality size in each county, 
and divided into two at the median. Separate regressions are run for the two groups. We 
suspect that welfare competition will be more prevalent in the “high-pressure” group that 
contains the municipalities in the counties with the lowest average municipality size, and 
equality is likely to have a lower effect in these municipalities, as welfare competition will 
drive the welfare norm down. Welfare policies in municipalities in the “low-pressure” group 
might be more robust to changes in neighboring municipalities’ welfare policies, as these 
municipalities might not have the same fear of a large influx of welfare recipients if their 
welfare policy is generous. As a result, equality could be expected to have a larger impact in 
these municipalities. 
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Table 7.2: fixed effects regression, “high-pressure” group, 1993-2008. Welfare_norm and income measured in 
constant, 1000 NOK.  Time- and municipality fixed effects included in all regressions. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES welfare_norm welfare_norm welfare_norm 
    
equality -0.111 0.231 0.235 
 (0.497) (0.506) (0.507) 
income -3.00e-05 0.000144 0.000172 
 (0.00102) (0.00103) (0.00103) 
pop1000  0.0126*** 0.0124*** 
  (0.00401) (0.00402) 
age06  1.127 1.200 
  (1.480) (1.483) 
age715  3.463*** 3.385*** 
  (1.279) (1.281) 
elderly  2.762** 2.619** 
  (1.211) (1.218) 
voteshare_left   0.252 
   (0.187) 
    
Observations 3,192 3,192 3,184 
R-squared 0.048 0.055 0.056 
Municipalities 207 207 207 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 7.3: fixed effects regression, “low-pressure” group, 1993-2008. Welfare_norm and income measured in 
constant, 1000 NOK. Time- and municipality fixed effects included in all regressions. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES welfare_norm welfare_norm welfare_norm 
    
equality -0.139 0.747 0.716 
 (0.432) (0.462) (0.463) 
income -0.000208 0.00202 0.00192 
 (0.00139) (0.00151) (0.00151) 
pop1000  0.0520*** 0.0531*** 
  (0.0133) (0.0134) 
age06  -0.662 -0.681 
  (1.467) (1.467) 
age715  -0.837 -0.868 
  (1.301) (1.301) 
elderly  4.986*** 5.035*** 
  (1.016) (1.017) 
voteshare_left   -0.134 
   (0.134) 
    
Observations 3,646 3,646 3,646 
R-squared 0.096 0.107 0.107 
Municipalities 229 229 229 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The equality coefficient is bigger in table 7.3 for the “low-pressure” group under specification 
(2) and (3), but none of the results are statistically significant. The difference in results could 
possibly be because welfare competition suppresses the positive effect of equality on 
redistribution in smaller municipalities, with local councils fearing an influx of welfare clients 
if they set their welfare norms higher. Even if this is the case the two coefficients are not 
statistically significantly different from each other, and the economic significance is still very 
small. Even though the coefficient in the “low-pressure” group is more than three times 
bigger than the coefficient in the “high-pressure” group under specification (2), a standard 
deviation increase in the equality would lead to a 11 NOK increase in the welfare norm for 
the municipalities in the “high-pressure” group, compared with a 35 NOK increase for the 
municipalities in the “low-pressure” group, indicating that equality does not have much of an 
impact in either of the groups. 
7.3 Average payments per recipient 
As mentioned, the politically decided welfare norm is not a strict rule in the municipalities, as 
the actual welfare payments are made by the local welfare offices. As such, it is not a given 
that the level of the political norm accurately describes the redistribution level. To counter 
this I will use another redistribution measure, with the dependent variable in table 7.4 now 
being the average monthly support per social client in the municipality,
13
 measured 
inconstant, 1000 NOK. The equation estimated is  
                                                                  (7.1) 
This is the same model used in the previous section with the same control variable 
specifications; except for the different dependent variable and that the time span is now 1997 
to 2008, due to the availability of data.  
 
 
                                                 
13
 This includes all welfare recipients, not just single-person households as with the welfare norm. 
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Table 7.4: fixed effects model, 1997-2008. Supportpercase and income measured in constant, 1000 NOK. Time- and 
municipality fixed effects included in all regressions. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES supportpercase supportpercase supportpercase 
    
equality -21.06*** -22.49*** -21.75*** 
 (4.351) (4.513) (4.509) 
income -0.0578*** -0.0616*** -0.0604*** 
 (0.00980) (0.0102) (0.0102) 
pop1000  0.0545 0.0501 
  (0.0598) (0.0597) 
age06  12.72 12.01 
  (14.92) (14.90) 
age715  -7.077 -8.876 
  (13.72) (13.71) 
elderly  -8.718 -10.63 
  (11.99) (12.01) 
voteshare_left   3.151** 
   (1.396) 
    
Observations 5,184 5,184 5,178 
R-squared 0.146 0.147 0.148 
Municipalities 437 437 437 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
We see that the equality coefficient is negative and statistically significant at the one percent 
level for all specifications, supporting the Meltzer-Richard hypothesis. Welfare clients in 
municipalities with a more unequal wage distribution receive a higher monthly welfare 
support, on average. This is in contrast to the results found in the three previous sections, with 
equality having a much larger impact in the regressions in table 7.4. A standard deviation 
increase in the equality measure would lead to a 988 NOK reduction of the average payment 
per welfare client in specification (1), a 1055 NOK reduction in specification (2) and a 1020 
NOK reduction in specification (3), all highly economically significant changes. An increase 
in the equality measure of one standard deviation would lead to an approximate reduction in 
the support per recipient of one-tenth of a standard deviation. 
This would seem to indicate that politicians and bureaucrats respond differently to increased 
inequality, or that the measure of average support per welfare recipient is flawed. The results 
could potentially be driven by a mechanical effect, as an increase in the number of welfare 
recipients in the municipalities would lead to lower wage equality, and an increase in the 
welfare support per case. The large magnitude of the equality coefficient in table 7.4 most 
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likely means that the dependent variable is not suited to test the effect of equality – it seems 
strange that equality should have a large negative impact on the actual welfare payments, but 
such a small positive impact on the politically decided welfare norm. 
To test if the introduction of a national guideline in 2001 has affected the support per welfare 
recipient, we again split the observations up into pre and post 2001 observations in table 7.5. 
Specification (1) covers the period 1997 - 2000, while (2) covers 2002 - 2008. Both include 
demographic variables, the average gross income and the political variable               .14 
We see that the two coefficients for equality are fairly similar and significant at the one 
percent level, indicating that the 2001 guideline has not had much of an impact on these 
results.  
Table 7.5: fixed effects model, 1997-2000 and 2002-2008. Supportpercase and income measured in constant, 1000 
NOK. Time- and municipality fixed effects included in all regressions. 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES supportpercase supportpercase 
   
equality -31.04*** -27.02*** 
 (7.806) (6.584) 
income -0.0791*** -0.0563*** 
 (0.0207) (0.0135) 
pop1000 0.403 0.0192 
 (0.289) (0.0945) 
age06 52.14 7.468 
 (35.48) (25.13) 
age715 -26.12 -48.52** 
 (32.72) (22.91) 
elderly 93.80*** 19.53 
 (31.77) (22.58) 
voteshare_left 3.218 1.250 
 (3.160) (1.905) 
   
Observations 1,732 3,013 
R-squared 0.073 0.032 
Municipalities 433 437 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
                                                 
14
 More basic specifications like the ones in previous sections did not have a significant impact on results and are 
not reported. 
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7.4 Extra controls 
Reported in table 7.6 and 7.7 are the main regressions from section 6 and section 7.3 done 
again, but now with the extra controls           , which is the percentage of the 
municipalities’ population that have completed a minimum of three years university or 
college education, and             , which is the percentage of the municipalities’ 
population that are unemployed. These controls have not been added earlier, as they are 
potentially endogenous. Municipalities with a well educated population are likely to have less 
people in need of welfare, as there generally is a high correlation between income and 
education. The opposite is the case with unemployment; the unemployed are much more 
likely to need government welfare to cover their daily expenses. 
Table 7.6: fixed effects model, 1993-2008. Welfare_norm and income measured in constant, 1000 NOK. Time- and 
municipality fixed effects included in all regressions. 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES welfare_norm welfare_norm 
   
equality 0.564* 0.524 
 (0.338) (0.342) 
income 0.00178** 0.00166** 
 (0.000777) (0.000796) 
pop1000 0.0152*** 0.0153*** 
 (0.00451) (0.00451) 
age06 0.892 0.873 
 (1.035) (1.035) 
age715 0.224 0.223 
 (0.901) (0.901) 
elderly 3.917*** 3.883*** 
 (0.769) (0.770) 
voteshare_left 0.0225 0.0235 
 (0.108) (0.108) 
edupercent 8.240*** 8.267*** 
 (2.978) (2.979) 
unemployment  -0.642 
  (0.882) 
   
Observations 6,830 6,830 
R-squared 0.077 0.077 
Municipalities 436 436 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
We see in table 7.6 that the two new variables reduce the results from table 6.2, but by very 
little and the difference is far from statistically significant. The new variables have the 
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predicted effect, with a higher educated population leading to a higher welfare norm ceteris 
paribus, and with increased unemployment leading to a decrease in the welfare norm. The 
effect of edupercent is statistically significant at the one percent level, but has little 
economical significance; a standard deviation increase in edupercent would lead to an 
increase in the welfare norm of 107 NOK. The effect of unemployment is close to zero and 
far from statistically significant. 
Table 7.7: fixed effects model, 1997-2008. Supportpercase and income measured in constant, 1000 NOK. Time- and 
municipality fixed effects included in all regressions. 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES supportpercase supportpercase 
   
equality -21.82*** -19.95*** 
 (4.509) (4.529) 
income -0.0593*** -0.0523*** 
 (0.0102) (0.0103) 
pop1000 0.0983 0.0970 
 (0.0666) (0.0665) 
age06 12.36 12.81 
 (14.90) (14.88) 
age715 -9.600 -10.59 
 (13.72) (13.70) 
elderly -10.11 -7.250 
 (12.02) (12.02) 
voteshare_left 3.186** 3.125** 
 (1.396) (1.394) 
edupercent -68.96 -71.97* 
 (42.19) (42.14) 
unemployment  47.69*** 
  (12.57) 
   
Observations 5,178 5,178 
R-squared 0.148 0.151 
Municipalities 437 437 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
We see from table 7.7 that the added controls have a minimal impact on equality’s effect on 
the payment per welfare client measure. The new controls now have the opposite effect on the 
support per case variable compared to the effect on the welfare norm. Unemployment has a 
much stronger effect in table 7.7 and is now statistically significant at the one percent level.  
The large difference between the effects of the extra control variables on the two measures of 
redistribution strengthens the suspicion that the regressions with support per case as the 
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dependent variable are troubled by a mechanical effect. As unemployment grows in a 
municipality, the average welfare payout per client will increase, due to the fact that there are 
now more people in need of substantial welfare assistance in the municipality, while equality 
will go down. Similarly, the average payout goes down when the education percentage 
increases, as this reduces the number of people in need of assistance, due to the positive 
correlation between education and income, and equality will increase, as the median will most 
likely approach the mean. It therefore seems like the support per case variable is not a suitable 
measure for the amount of redistribution in the municipality, rather it would seem to reflect 
the total need for welfare among the municipalities’ welfare clients.   
8 Conclusions 
This thesis has attempted to estimate the relationship between wage inequality and 
redistribution, using econometrics. The empirical work is done on Norwegian municipalities 
due to their similar size and structure, and their freedom when it comes to choosing their level 
of welfare benefits. The monthly welfare payments to single-person households, set by local 
politicians, have been used as the main measure for the amount of redistribution in each 
municipality.  
The results from the regressions point mostly in the same direction, that increased equality 
has a small, statistically significant, positive effect on the welfare norm in each municipality, 
going against the Meltzer-Richard hypothesis. This effect is however so small that it carries 
little economic significance, and the main finding of this thesis is perhaps that wage 
inequality seems to have had little effect on the amount of redistribution in Norwegian 
municipalities from 1993 to 2008, at least through the channel of increased generosity 
towards welfare clients.  
It is possible that equality does have a bigger effect on the amount of redistribution through 
other channels than the one looked at in this thesis. Borge and Rattsø (2004) finds that 
increased wage inequality leads to increased property tax in Norwegian municipalities; this 
possibility is not looked at in this thesis. It is also possible that equality has another, 
potentially stronger effect on redistribution, targeted towards other groups in society than 
welfare clients, such as the middle class. This is proposed by Moene and Wallerstein (2001). 
Ramcharan (2010) studies the relationship utilizing an instrumental variable approach to 
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establish causality, and finds a possible downward bias in his OLS results due to reverse 
causality. This could potentially be an issue in my results, although I judge this to be unlikely 
due to the measure of redistribution chosen. 
The results also show the fact that local governments adapted to the national guideline for 
monthly welfare support introduced in 2001, with wage inequality having a positive effect on 
the results before the introduction of the guideline, and a negative effect afterwards. Equality 
is also found to have more of an effect on larger municipalities compared to the smaller ones, 
although this difference is small and not statistically significant. Knowing the results of 
previous studies on Norwegian municipalities, it seems likely that this difference is due to 
welfare competition. 
The thesis also looks at how the average welfare payout per client in each municipality is 
affected by wage inequality. These results strongly contradict the earlier results, with equality 
having a large, statistically significant, negative effect on welfare payments. These results 
could indicate that bureaucrats and politicians respond differently to changes in wage 
inequality, or it could be that the average welfare payment per client variable is not suitable 
for use in the regressions because it does not account for the number of welfare clients in each 
municipality, or the heterogeneous nature of welfare clients as a group. The large discrepancy 
between the effect of equality on the politically decided welfare norm and the payments per 
recipient may indicate that there are problems with the payments per recipient variable. The 
effect of adding controls who measure the municipalities’ education- and unemployment 
levels point in this direction, and show signs of a potential mechanical effect in the regression. 
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